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Abstract 
Purpose of the study: The purpose of the study was to investigate and measure the competitive environment 
in the banking sector in Oman. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: This study considered an effort towards measuring the nature of 
competition of 12 out of 16 Omani banks from 2009 to 2019 over applying Panzar and Rosse (PR-model). It 
measured the competition index, called H-statistic, as it gives a quantitative assessment of the competitive 
nature of the studied market. The non-structural model was adopted to measure the competitive behaviour of 
the banking sector. The data was taken from Muscat Securities Market (MSM) over obtaining financial 
statements of banks and data was tested using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). 
Findings: The result showed that it was not able to reject the monopolistic competition that H value 
considered between values of zero and one for the banking market in Oman. Thus, Omani banks operate 
under monopolistic competition. 
Practical Implications: The study has interesting policy implications. It is recommended to encourage 
foreign banks' presence to enhance the competitive condition of the banking sector thus making sure the exit 
and entrance of banks in the industry to raise the competition. 
Social Implications: The flexibility in the competitive condition of the banking sector will lead to increase 
competition so this will produce a variety of services and products to improve the banks’ performance and 
customer satisfaction. 
Originality/value: This is the first study of its kind in studying and testing the competitive environment for 
the banking sector in Oman using the PR-model.   
 
Keywords: Banking Competition in Oman, Monopolistic Competition, Market Equilibrium, Market 
contestability, Pazan and Rosse (PR model). 
 
Introduction 
There are many pre-requisites to establish a sound and effective financial system in a country.  The banking 
and financial sector is influenced by the extent of the country’s intervention, and it reflects the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth. The importance of financial institutions’ performance lies in raising the 
rate of economic growth, which has made researchers interested in studying this aspect (Al-Muharrami et al., 
2006). While Odedokun (1998) found that financial intermediation is an effective method for the growth of 
the national economy in developing countries.  The banking sector faces many challenges, such as instability 
risk with its impact on the assets and liabilities. Banks are more exposed to the risk of overstretching in their 
investments than other institutions.  Therefore, the potential for exacerbation of these risks is huge when 
banks operate in a competitive environment, and this appears over increasing both bailouts and risk of 
closures in the event of failure of individual financial institutions (Polemis, 2015).  The subject of the banking 
industry is one of the major topics in the field of scientific research and it is related to the nature of banking 
competition and the extent of its positive impact in terms of economic and financial stability.  The theory of 
competition along with the market clarifies the relationship between competition, economic stability, quality 
of services, and growth demonstrated that the number of competitors is small through this theory (Perrakis 
et al., 1982). However, the main driver behind the market competition is the great pressure generated by the 
entry of a new competitor into the market. To measure the competitive behaviour of the banking sector, the 
non-structural model will be adopted.  Competitive models measure by focusing on competitive behavior 
among banks without the need to use clear information about market structuring (Bresnahan, 1982 and Panzar 
& Rosse, 1987). It depends on measuring competition by relying on deviations of competitive pricing that 
can be derived from the conditions of profit maximization balance, and these are considered as their main 
advantage when compared to other structural measures (Bikker et al., 2009). The main reason why these 
models are described as non-structural is that they are based on assumptions that factor does not focus on a 
market structure that influence their competitive behaviour among banks.  Many studies related to the 
banking sector are based on the Panzar and Rosse model for measuring a competition index, called H-statistic, 
as it gives a quantitative assessment of the competitive nature of the studied market. The H-statistic is 
calculated through reduced-form revenue equations and measures the elasticity of total revenue related to 
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changes in factor input prices (Panzar & Willig, 1977). Therefore, this research is conducted as the first study 
in this field as H statistics is used as a measure of competition.  
 
Murjan & Ruza (2002) concluded that banking sectors in both the MENA region operate under monopolistic 
competition while in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) tend to have a lower rate of competition during the 
period from 1993-2002. While Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) summarized that banking sectors operate within 
the monopolistic competition. Turk Ariss (2008) analysed competition for 12 countries in the MENA region 
found that monopolistic competition is common in most banking sectors in the MENA region. It was also 
concluded the indicators of both the market contestability and the activity restrictions are significant factors 
to determine the level of competition among countries in the region. The non-structural model was used 
based on the P-R approach (Panzar & Willig, 1977; Panzar & Rosse, 1982; Panzar & Rosse, 1987) to test 
and assess the nature of competition along with the banking sector market in Oman. 
 
Review of Literature 
Khan et al. (2018) studied the effect of small changes in total revenue belong to bank earn the cost, concluded 
the banking industry go through monopolistic competition and was touching a perfectly competitive 
environment. Gutiérrez de Rozas (2007) concluded that the banking system operating under competition, 
which was the result of concentration. Bikker & Haaf (2002) focused on studying the market structure of 
Banks, their concentration, and the relationship between competition and concentration. Claessens & Laeven 
(2004) used the method of Panzar and Rosse to reflect the strength of the relationship between concentration 
and contestability to determine the bank's competition. Park & Weber (2006) identified the actual structure 
through which the banks can earn their profits. The result showed that the banks earn their profits under 
monopolistic competition. Duncan and Langrin (2004) adopted the PR model to examine the competitiveness 
of market structure for the banking industry. It indicated that the banking sector was running under 
monopolistic competition to earn its profits. Drakos and Konstantinou (2005) calculated H-statistic from the 
reduced form equation to provide the estimated value and worked out F-test. The outcome indicated that the 
range of 0 and 1 is the value so it concluded that the structure was monopolistic. Hussain et al. (2013) obtained 
the revenues in the banks operating under monopolistic competition and market imbalance. Rahman et al. 
(2019) studied the relationship between credit cost and interbank-competition showed that bank competition 
obtains a positive impact in terms of credit cost. Su et al. (2020) examined the impact of competition in the 
banking industry in terms of stability, or vulnerability. They displayed a negative impact on systematic risk 
and competition support of the financial system stability.  Chemmanur et al.  (2020) investigated the 
association between larger bank competition and the screening of potential borrowers and found that bank 
credit was highly affected by borrowing-firm. Fungáčová et al. (2017) examined the influence of bank 
competition on the growth of the economy over studying the impact of competition in the context of bank 
credit cost. They got that bank competition rises the credit cost and indicates a positive influence of bank 
competition is stronger for smaller companies.  
 
Murjan and Ruza (2002) studied the power of competition in the MENA region concluded that banking 
sectors in both MENA region operate under monopolistic competition. Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) 
summarized that banking sectors operate within the monopolistic competition. Turk Ariss (2008) analysed 
competition for the countries in the MENA region about the factors clarifying the differences in banking 
competition. It was concluded that the indicators of both market contestability and activity restrictions are 
significant factors in determining the level of competition among countries in the region. 
 
Non-Structural Approach 
Demsetz (1973) and Pelzman (1977) argued that the efficiency measure was the source of focus rather than 
market power. They found that the company's competencies might be different and thus this may create 
uneven market shares as well as a high level of focus. The difference in efficiency can be seen from top 
management and production technology (Neuberger, 1997). Manson assumed that the price rises are easy for 
companies with a high concentration in the market. Here the price was higher than marginal cost and therefore 
less efficient. While Shaffer (1994) discussed the issue of considering price decline as an indicator for 
measuring market efficiency. He explained that competition would appear between companies at lower 
prices. Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) model assumed a one-way relationship between structure, 
behaviour, and performance. Therefore, the market structure was affected by corporate behaviour and vice 
versa (Vesala, 1995). The non-structural approach argued that corporate behaviour and market structure are 
correlated due to the retroactive effects of behaviour on market structure (Vesala, 1995). It was found that 
market performance influenced decisions regarding companies entering the market. Perrakis et al. (1982) 
found that the main feature of disputed markets was the freedom to enter and exit the market. This type of 
market attracts customers through the low price and it is easy to recover the costs as the company exits the 
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market because the old companies will take retaliate because of the low prices. Panzar & Rosse (1987) 
developed a method that depended on the company's cost structure. This method relied on distinguishing the 
level of competition in the markets, by knowing the relationship between corporate revenues and factors that 
change prices.  Bikker and Haaf (2002) and De Bandt and Davis (2000) studied the influence of the banking 
consolidations in the US and European countries on the competition.  Molyneux et al. (1994) attempted to 
measure consolidation’s influence on competition in the initial implementation of the single market policy in 
the context of banks. 
 
Research Methodology 
Secondary data was used in this study. All commercial banks in Oman either local or foreign banks have 
been included in this study. The data was taken from the websites of the Central Bank of Oman (CBO) and 
Muscat Securities Market (MSM). The financial statements of the seven local banks were collected from the 
financial statements of banks, specifically from the balance sheet and income statement for the period 2009 
to 2019, while the financial statements of foreign banks were collected from their websites separately.  
Overall, the data was obtained from 12 banks. This was the most comprehensive data sample ever used in 
implementing the P-R methodology of the Omani banking industry.  PR-approach was used in the study 
Panzar and Rosse (1982) and Panzar & Rosse (1987) over utilizing different pricing strategies to find out the 
required cost and revenue at the different conditions of the market.  The study went through measuring the 
level of competition either its monopoly, perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, or natural 
monopoly upon pierce competition of the market.  Two equations were to apply the Bank's fixed-effect 
model. This research study tested the competitive environment of the Omani banking industry in the context 
of the public relations approach. Where the first equation was as follows: 
In(𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1In(𝐼𝐸𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2In(𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3In(𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾1In(𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾2In(𝑁𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾3In(𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿𝐷 +
𝜇1 + 𝑖𝑡 )-----1 
Where i and t signify bank and year, IRit – Gross Interest Revenue(IR) divided by Total assets which are used 
as a proxy for bank Output prices (dependent variable); IEit – Interest Expense(IE) divided by Total Deposits 
which is used as a proxy for input cost (independent variable);  PEit – Personal  Expenses (PE-Salaries of 
staff) divided by Total assets which are used as a proxy for input cost of labour (independent variable); OEit 
– Operating Expenses (OE) and administrative Expenses divided by Total Assets as a proxy for the cost of 
fixed assets (independent variable); ETit – Equity divided by Total Asset. (Independent Variables); NLTit – 
Net loan divided by Total Asset (independent variable); TAit – Natural Log of Total asset used as a proxy for 
size effect (independent variable);  D – dummy year, µ - bank-specific fixed effect (independent variable); 
µi – Bank specific fixed effect. 
 
The PR-H-Statistics defined as the sum of coefficients of IE, PE and OE i.e.  
(𝐻 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2 + 𝛽3)-----2 
H-Statistics can have a value less than or equal to zero, between zero and one, or equal to one.  If the value 
of H≤0 means that the banking, market in Oman operates under monopoly or short-run oligopoly.  If the 
value of H=1 means that the banking market is in a state of perfect competition, natural monopoly.  If the 
value of 0<H<1 means that banks in Oman are operating under monopolistic competition. The overall 
assumption of H-Statistics shown in three main assumptions. The first assumption is when H ≤ 0, banks are 
under monopoly equilibrium imply each bank operates independently as under monopoly profit 
maximization conditions (H is a decreasing function of the perceived demand elasticity) or perfect cartel. 
The second assumption is when 0 < H < 1, banks are monopolistic competition's free entry equilibrium (H is 
an increasing function of the perceived demand elasticity). The third assumption that means banks are perfect 
competition – Free entry equilibrium with full efficient capacity utilization (Panzar & Willig, 1997; Panzar 
& Rosse, 1982; Panzar & Rosse, 1987; Nathan & Neave, 1989). 
 
 
Table 1: General Information of Licensed banks in Oman (as of 31.12.2018) 








1 National Bank of Oman SAOG 1973 61 61 
2 Oman Arab Bank SAOG 1973 57 57 
3 HSBC Bank of Oman SAOG 1975 48 48 
4 Bank Muscat SAOG 1981 149 149 
5 Bank Dhofar SAOG 1990 61 61 
6 Sohar International Bank 2007 30 30 
7 Ahli Bank SAOG 1997 14 14 
  
International Journal of Research in Entrepreneurship & Business Studies 
                                                                                                                                                       Vol. 1, issue. 2, 2020, pp. 34-44 
https://doi.org/10.47259/ijrebs.123 
             Competition in Omani Banking Sector  36 
 
Foreign banks 
8 Standard Chartered Bank 1968 1 1 
9 Habib Bank Limited 1972 7 7 
10 Bank Melli Iran 1974 1 1 
11 National Bank of Abu Dhabi  1976 7 7 
12 Bank Saderat Iran 1976 1 1 
13 Bank of Baroda 1976 3 3 
14 State Bank of India 2004 1 1 
15 Bank of Beirut 2006 5 5 
16 Qatar National Bank 2007 5 5 
Total 451 451 
 
However, only 12 banks were included in this study as some of the banks recently opened ones in Oman where 
others had not published their financial statements. Accordingly, the 12 banks are classified into two main categories 
i.e. local and foreign banks. The local banks are National Bank of Oman SAOG, Oman Arab Bank SAOG, HSBC 
Bank of Oman SAOG, Bank Muscat SAOG, Bank Dhofar SAOG, Sohar International Bank, and Ahli Bank SAOG. 
The foreign banks are Standard Chartered Bank, Habib Bank Limited, National Bank of Abu Dhabi, State Bank of 
India, and Qatar National Bank. 
 
Appendix.1 shows the annual data of the twelve banks. The data set is shown separately for each bank and these 
data represented the following variables gross interest revenue, total assets, interest expense, total deposits, personal 
expenses, operating expenses, equity, and net loan for the duration from 2009 to 2019.  
 






































































































































































2009 3% -21% -1% -2% 14% 76% 1440% 
2010 3% -30% -1% -2% 15% 76% 1441% 
2011 3% -16% -1% -2% 13% 75% 1462% 
2012 3% -19% -1% -2% 12% 75% 1475% 
2013 3% -19% -1% -2% 11% 71% 1488% 
2014 3% -36% -1% -2% 12% 78% 1491% 
2015 3% -19% -1% -2% 16% 78% 1500% 
2016 3% -17% -1% -2% 15% 76% 1508% 
2017 3% -43% -1% -2% 16% 76% 1506% 
2018 3% -40% -1% -2% 15% 79% 1509% 
2019 2% -26% -1% -2% 15% 77% 1511% 
Oman Arab 
Bank 
2009 4% -1% -1% -2% 15% 66% 1366% 
2010 3% -1% 0% -2% 15% 69% 1377% 
2011 3% -1% -1% -2% 14% 74% 1392% 
2012 3% -1% 0% -2% 13% 68% 1413% 
2013 3% -1% 0% -2% 13% 74% 1419% 
2014 2% -1% 0% -2% 11% 69% 1441% 
2015 2% -1% -1% -2% 11% 77% 1450% 
2016 2% -2% -1% -2% 14% 77% 1454% 
2017 3% -2% 0% -2% 13% 77% 1458% 
2018 3% -2% 0% -2% 15% 79% 1466% 
2019 3% -2% -1% -2% 15% 80% 1473% 
HSBC Bank of 
Oman 
2009 3% -1% -2% -2% 16% 59% 1385% 
2010 3% -1% -1% -2% 15% 55% 1396% 
2011 2% -1% -1% -2% 14% 55% 1404% 
2012 2% -1% -1% -2% 12% 50% 1470% 
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2013 2% -1% -1% -3% 14% 44% 1461% 
2014 2% 0% -1% -2% 14% 52% 1462% 
2015 2% 0% -1% -2% 14% 55% 1460% 
2016 2% 0% -1% -2% 14% 63% 1463% 
2017 2% 0% -1% -2% 14% 60% 1466% 
2018 3% -1% -1% -2% 14% 59% 1467% 
2019 2% -1% -1% -2% 14% 59% 1475% 
Bank Muscat 
2009 3% -3% -1% -3% 12% 66% 1558% 
2010 3% -2% -2% -3% 14% 68% 1558% 
2011 3% -2% -2% -2% 12% 67% 1579% 
2012 3% -2% -2% -2% 13% 71% 1588% 
2013 3% -2% -2% -2% 14% 69% 1595% 
2014 2% -2% -2% -2% 13% 66% 1609% 
2015 2% -1% -1% -2% 11% 53% 1634% 
2016 2% -2% -1% -2% 14% 66% 1620% 
2017 2% -2% -2% -2% 16% 66% 1623% 
2018 2% -2% -1% -2% 16% 64% 1632% 
2019 2% -2% -1% -2% 16% 63% 1632% 
Bank Dhofar 
2009 3% -3% -1% -2% 14% 80% 1421% 
2010 3% -2% -2% -2% 14% 76% 1432% 
2011 3% -2% -2% -2% 12% 76% 1449% 
2012 3% -2% -2% -2% 12% 78% 1458% 
2013 3% -2% -2% -2% 12% 73% 1477% 
2014 2% -1% -1% -1% 10% 71% 1498% 
2015 2% -1% -1% -1% 13% 76% 1509% 
2016 2% -2% -1% -1% 14% 76% 1519% 
2017 2% -3% -1% -1% 14% 77% 1526% 
2018 2% -3% -1% -2% 17% 66% 1525% 




2009 2% -4% -1% -2% 11% 77% 1384% 
2010 2% -3% -1% -2% 10% 72% 1405% 
2011 2% -2% -1% -2% 9% 71% 1417% 
2012 2% -2% -1% -1% 8% 64% 1440% 
2013 2% -2% -1% -1% 9% 68% 1445% 
2014 2% -2% -1% -2% 9% 69% 1455% 
2015 2% -2% -1% -1% 11% 75% 1461% 
2016 2% -3% -1% -1% 11% 76% 1474% 
2017 2% -4% -1% -1% 14% 74% 1486% 
2018 2% -4% -1% -1% 9% 74% 1493% 
2019 2% -4% -1% -1% 10% 70% 1507% 
Ahli Bank 
2009 2% -3% -1% -1% 15% 72% 2024% 
2010 2% -2% -1% -1% 13% 81% 2051% 
2011 3% -2% -1% -2% 13% 83% 2065% 
2012 3% -2% -1% -1% 15% 84% 1391% 
2013 3% -2% -1% -1% 14% 82% 1411% 
2014 2% -2% -1% -1% 12% 84% 1431% 
2015 2% -2% -1% -1% 12% 80% 1446% 
2016 2% -2% -1% -1% 13% 80% 1446% 
2017 2% -3% -1% -1% 15% 81% 1452% 
2018 2% -3% -1% -1% 16% 82% 1464% 
2019 2% -4% -1% -1% 15% 82% 1474% 
Qatar National 
Bank 
2009 2% -3% -1% -2% 11% 61% 1676% 
2010 2% -2% -1% -3% 11% 59% 1698% 
2011 3% -1% 0% -1% 14% 64% 1728% 
2012 2% -1% 0% -1% 13% 68% 1747% 
2013 3% -2% 0% -1% 12% 70% 1766% 
2014 3% -2% 0% -1% 12% 70% 1776% 
2015 2% -2% 0% -1% 12% 72% 1786% 
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2016 2% -4% -1% -1% 10% 54% 1815% 
2017 2% -4% 0% -1% 10% 72% 1827% 
2018 2% -5% 0% -1% 10% 71% 1833% 
2019 2% -5% 0% -1% 10% 72% 1842% 
State Bank of 
India 
2009 8% -6% -2% -2% 0% 6% 1771% 
2010 8% -6% -2% -2% 0% 10% 1780% 
2011 8% -5% -2% -2% 0% 10% 1795% 
2012 9% -6% -2% -2% 0% 10% 1803% 
2013 9% -6% -2% -2% 0% 11% 1819% 
2014 9% -6% -2% -2% 0% 10% 1833% 
2015 9% -6% -2% -2% 0% 10% 1846% 
2016 8% -6% -2% -2% 0% 14% 1860% 
2017 8% -6% -2% -2% 0% 12% 1874% 
2018 6% -5% -2% -2% 0% 10% 1898% 
2019 7% -5% -2% -2% 0% 11% 1905% 
National Bank 
of Abu Dhabi 
2009 2% -2% -3% -1% 10% 67% 1684% 
2010 2% -2% -3% -1% 11% 65% 1691% 
2011 2% -1% -2% -1% 10% 62% 1710% 
2012 2% -1% -2% -1% 10% 55% 1727% 
2013        
2014 2% -1% 0% -1% 9% 52% 1749% 
2015 2% -1% -4% -1% 11% 51% 1757% 
2016 2% -1% -1% -1% 15% 52% 1804% 
2017 2% -1% -1% -1% 15% 49% 1807% 
2018 2% -2% 0% -1% 14% 47% 1817% 
2019 2% -2% 0% -1% 13% 50% 1827% 
Habib Bank 
Limited 
2009 5% -5% 0% -3% 10% 53% 1512% 
2010 5% -5% 0% -3% 10% 49% 1520% 
2011 5% -5% 0% -3% 10% 40% 1532% 
2012 4% -5% 0% -2% 8% 31% 1567% 
2013 3% -5% 0% -2% 8% 33% 1570% 
2014 4% -5% 0% -2% 9% 32% 1574% 
2015 4% -4% 0% -2% 8% 29% 1592% 
2016 4% -4% 0% -3% 8% 30% 1576% 
2017 3% -3% 0% -2% 7% 32% 1583% 
2018 3% -4% 0% -3% 7% 36% 1594% 




2009 2% -2% -1% -2% 6% 12% 1203% 
2010 2% -2% -1% -2% 8% 10% 1220% 
2011 2% -2% -1% -2% 7% 46% 1234% 
2012 2% -2% -1% -2% 7% 45% 1241% 
2013 2% -2% -1% -2% 7% 44% 1247% 
2014 2% -1% -1% -1% 6% 40% 1254% 
2015 1% -1% -1% -2% 8% 41% 1242% 
2016 2% 0% -1% -2% 8% 40% 1243% 
2017 2% 0% 0% -2% 8% 43% 1245% 
2018 1% -2% -1% -2% 7% 37% 1249% 
2019 1% -2% -1% -2% 7% 37% 1253% 
 
Findings 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
 Ir 132 .029 .017 0 .091 
 Ie 132 .044 .072 0 .433 
 Pe 132 .01 .007 0 .038 
 Oe 132 .017 .005 0 .035 
 Et 132 .109 .043 0 .166 
 Nlt 132 .58 .217 0 .844 
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 Ta 132 15.427 2.285 0 20.65 
 
Table.3 shows that Ta has the highest mean value of 15.427 with Std. Dev. of 2.285. Moreover, the Pe has the 
lowest mean of .01 and .007 as Std. Dev. In general, almost all the independent variables result that the data points 
tend to be close to the mean of the data set due to all of them carry out low standard deviation. 
Table 4. Pairwise correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Ir 1.000       
(2) Ie 0.119 1.000      
(3) Pe 0.273 0.053 1.000     
(4) Oe 0.310 0.110 -0.062 1.000    
(5) Et -0.635 0.083 -0.155 -0.009 1.000   
(6) Nlt -0.565 0.135 -0.116 -0.152 0.825 1.000  
(7) Ta 0.430 0.032 0.199 -0.016 -0.064 -0.028 1.000 
 
 
Table.4 shows the correlation between each variable with each one another. In terms of all variables, the correlation 
indicates a negative correlation as seen in Figure.1 but once for the 1,2,3, and 4 variables, it shows a positive 
correlation which is seen in Figure.2. This is because of missing values of some banks’ data sets. 
Figure 1. Negative correlation 
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Table 5. Results based on the fixed effect 






 Interval]  Sig 
Ie .009 .012 0.78 .44 -.014 .032  
Pe -.101 .084 -1.20 .231 -.268 .065  
Oe .127 .129 0.98 .328 -.129 .384  
Et .086 .023 3.70 0 .04 .132 *** 
Nlt .024 .005 4.71 0 .014 .035 *** 
Ta 0 0 -0.69 .491 -.001 0  
2009b.ye
ar 
0 . . . . .  
2010.year .001 .001 0.53 .596 -.002 .004  
2011.year 0 .002 -0.10 .923 -.003 .003  
2012.year -.001 .002 -0.54 .592 -.004 .002  
2013.year -.002 .002 -1.20 .233 -.005 .001  
2014.year -.003 .002 -1.64 .103 -.006 .001  
2015.year -.004 .002 -2.32 .022 -.007 -.001 ** 
2016.year -.003 .002 -2.24 .027 -.006 0 ** 
2017.year -.007 .002 -4.17 0 -.01 -.004 *** 
2018.year -.008 .002 -5.16 0 -.011 -.005 *** 
2019.year -.008 .002 -4.94 0 -.011 -.005 *** 




0.029 SD dependent var  0.017 
R-squared  0.573 Number of obs.   132.000 
F-test   8.710 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. 
(AIC) 
-1112.651 Bayesian crit. (BIC) -1063.643 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
From Table.5, it can be seen that the fixed effect test is significant at a 5% significance level determined that 
the fixed model considers an idle method to estimate such data. Regarding the strength of the correlation is 
observed from the R-squared value. R-squared value is 0.573 which indicates a strong correlation. 
Table 6. Linear regression 




 [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
ie  .031 .013 2.48 .015 .006 .056 ** 
Pe .266 .141 1.89 .061 -.013 .545 * 
Oe .875 .175 4.99 0 .527 1.222 *** 
Et -.211 .038 -5.55 0 -.286 -.136 *** 
Nlt -.006 .008 -0.74 .461 -.021 .009  
Ta .003 0 7.10 0 .002 .004 *** 
2009b.year 0 . . . . .  
2010.year .001 .004 0.15 .881 -.007 .009  
2011.year .001 .004 0.15 .885 -.008 .009  
2012.year .001 .004 0.17 .863 -.007 .009  
2013.year 0 .004 0.08 .939 -.008 .009  
2014.year -.003 .004 -0.81 .42 -.012 .005  
2015.year -.003 .004 -0.78 .434 -.011 .005  
2016.year -.001 .004 -0.14 .885 -.009 .008  
2017.year -.001 .004 -0.28 .781 -.01 .007  
2018.year -.004 .004 -1.01 .317 -.013 .004  
2019.year -.005 .004 -1.08 .281 -.013 .004  
Constant -.006 .008 -0.75 .454 -.023 .01  
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Mean dependent var 0.029 SD dependent var  0.017 
R-squared  0.695 Number of obs.   132.000 
F-test   16.370 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) -825.258 Bayesian crit. (BIC) -776.251 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
Table.6 showed that R-squared=0.695 demonstrates a strong correlation and the descriptive variables are 
applicable in explaining 75% of the dependent variable. Low SD indicates that the data points tend to be 
close to the average of the data set. The results represent that we reject the null hypothesis and take the 
alternative at 5% significance level. It obtains that bank-specific fixed are in the data and estimation of the 
fixed-effect model can take place in these results. In a way, every single variable that in equation (1) is 
statically significant at 5% significance level. The results of the variables Pe, and Oe has positive and 
significant coefficients. It shows that higher input prices reflect higher revenue to banks. Et shows lower 
equity of banks i.e. banks play in risk condition are gaining more revenue. About the major results (basic 
hypothesis and H-statistics) outlined over adding the coefficient value of Pe and Oe respectively.  
 
H-statistics result from the equation (1) that (H= β1+ β 2 + β3) so, H= 0.031+0.266+0.875 = 1.172. Therefore, 
the natural competition of the banking industry shows the same result of a fixed effect, which is monopolistic 
competition. So any 1% cost increase will be reflected with an increase but less than 1% in the revenue as 
the rate of elasticity of demand is not the required level. 
 
A regression assesses the relationship between two or more dependent variables. Once this is executed, an 
F-value and its significance level is calculated. The common significant level for F-value is p < .05. Thus, 
the model describes a significant amount of variance in the outcome variable. R2 acts as an indicator in the 
percent of the variance in the outcome variable that is explained through the set of predictor variables (Lani, 
2020).  
Table 7. Revised Regression results 
Ir  Coeff.  Std.Err.  t-
value 
 p-value  [95% Conf  Interval]  Sig 
Ie .013 .014 0.89 .373 -.015 .041  
Pe -.005 .107 -0.05 .96 -.215 .204  
Oe .141 .162 0.87 .385 -.177 .46  
Et .023 .029 0.80 .426 -.034 .08  
Nlt .009 .006 1.37 .171 -.004 .021  
Ta .001 0 1.75 .08 0 .001 * 
2009 0 . . . . .  
2010 .001 .002 0.31 .76 -.003 .004  
2011 0 .002 -0.09 .932 -.004 .004  
2012 -.001 .002 -0.49 .625 -.005 .003  
2013 -.002 .002 -1.13 .26 -.006 .002  
2014 -.003 .002 -1.56 .118 -.007 .001  
2015 -.004 .002 -2.01 .044 -.008 0 ** 
2016 -.003 .002 -1.60 .11 -.007 .001  
2017 -.006 .002 -2.81 .005 -.01 -.002 *** 
2018 -.008 .002 -3.77 0 -.012 -.004 *** 
2019 -.007 .002 -3.69 0 -.011 -.004 *** 




0.029 SD dependent var  0.017 
Overall r-squared  0.009 Number of obs   132.000 
Chi-square   62.444 Prob > chi2  0.000 
R-squared within 0.484 R-squared between 0.153 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
The results reported in Table.7 display that the null hypothesis is rejected. In contrast, the null hypothesis 
(H0 = 0 < H < 1) is accepted at 5% significance level. F-statistics and the corresponding p-value is shown in 
Table.8. The basis of such outcomes argued that banks in Oman for a period of 2009-2019. It seems to be in 
a state of monopolistic competition due to the sum of H- statistics is 0.149 (0.013 + -0.005 + 0.141) the result 
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of Ie, Pe, and Oe respectively. Therefore, any minor change in cost by increased at 1% will be reflected with 
an increase but less than 1% in the revenue. As the rate of elasticity of demand is not to the required level. 
 
Conclusion 
We know that banks play an unimaginable role in allocating economic resources in countries. Also, their 
practice has a fundamental impact on providing liquidity insurance, transferring assets, and obtaining 
payment services. All of these contribute to the growth and development of the economy. From this 
standpoint, it is essential to measure the competition level in the banking markets appears to be widely 
justified.  Competition analysis has to be transformed into a successful area of the banking economy. 
Therefore, the interest revenue acts as the dependent variable in this equation. Furthermore, there are other 
variables linked with the estimated equation which are the bank-specific control. This equation is appraised 
based on the model of bank-specific fixed effect.  The equation of competition test for the sample period 
2009-2019 confirms the presence of monopolistic competition among Omani banks. As for other analysis 
that is done in this study, are somewhat similar to that we could not reject the null hypothesis of monopolistic 
competition for the sample period. Also, for the secondary result that seen in the analysis and the model 
specification, individual variables are concerned both the input cost variable and banks specific variable), 
fixed effect model is shown significant value in the equation. Both the R-squared value and other criteria of 
the best model are fulfilled.  The input price of funds has a positive relationship with the banks' revenue.  We 
find from the results of the study that the relationship of equity and revenues is negative and this indicates 
that the bank that risks getting high revenues. While the variable size shows a positive relationship with 
revenues, large banks can obtain high returns when compared to small banks. The same applies to banks that 
offer banking facilities such as loans. Finally, the financial banking sector can only be compared to specific 
sectors. The views are mixed regarding the degree of competition desired in the financial banking sector.  
Intense competition is supposed to be a reason to reduce mediation expenses and improve efficiency. This 
comes at the expense of undermining the lending period, thereby reducing the profitability of banks. 
Therefore, both the solvency and the ability of financial institutions to withstand liquidity shocks could be 
seriously undermined. We also find that the exchange context that banking regulators play reinforces its role 
in providing the necessary barrier against negative developments. From clarifying concepts related to 
financial stability, efforts must be made towards the common fundamentals behind competition banking 
sectors. 
Recommendations 
The monopolistic competitive environment also has a low rate of entry and exit from the banking market. 
Therefore, excellence in the services provided plays a major role in increasing the bank’s profits in the short 
term. In the event of raising the interest rate, wherein the long term increase in customers while maintaining 
reasonable profitability. The monopolistic competition reflects that any increase of 1% means an increase in 
profits. This is because the rate of demand elasticity is not at the expected level. Therefore, banks must 
intensively be marketing their services in a way that reflects the hidden differences that the customer may 
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